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Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00899A000900080001-8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum



THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Information as of 1600 16 June 1966

ARMY, DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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16 June 1966

HIGHLIGHTS

The government's move with force against dissidents in Hue has thus far resulted in relatively little violence. Another North Vietnamese Army regiment has been confirmed in South Vietnam.

- I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Heavy fighting was reported early today between a Viet Cong battalion and a USMC reconnaissance team near Chu Lai (Para. 1). MACV confirms another North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiment in South Vietnam (Paras. 2-3). A recently reported NVA unit was apparently destined for southern South Vietnam (Paras. 4-5). Weekly review of South Vietnam transportation routes and battle statistics (Paras. 6-7).
- II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: The government's forceful move against dissidents in Hue has been accompanied by relatively little violence thus far (Paras. 1-4). Police continued to disperse Buddhist demonstrators in Saigon to-day (Para. 5), as Buddhist Institute representatives told US Embassy officers that militants now determining Institute policy are determined to maintain their hard line until Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu are deposed (Paras. 6-7).

IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. Communist Political Developments: A French Foreign Office official has characterized as much too optimistic the recent press report that Hanoi is moving toward accepting the idea of a peaceful settlement of the war (Paras. 1-4).


ANNEX:

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 May 1966

General Statistical Data Composite Annual Totals Viet Cong Incidents

South Vietnam: Battle Statistics

Personnel Losses--May 1966 Viet Cong Incidents--May 1966 Weapons Losses--May 1966 Chieu Hoi--May 1966 Desertions--April 1966



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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Communist forces, striking in estimated battalion-strength, launched a predawn attack today against an 18-man US Marine reconnaissance team defending an isolated hilltop observation post approximately 12 miles northwest of Chu Lai. Tactical air strikes and artillery bombardment supported the badly outnumbered Marine unit, but heavy ground fire in the vicinity of available landing zones impeded reinforcement and extraction operations for almost six hours. Preliminary results of the action indicate US losses of nine killed, 15 wounded, and two helicopters damaged and one destroyed. Enemy casualties have been placed at 43 killed.

Another PAVN Regiment in South Vietnam

2. MACV has accepted another North Vietnamese Army regiment—the 88th—in South Vietnam. The 88th has a strength of 2,000 men and is located in the triborder area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam adjacent to Kontum Province. It is the fifteenth confirmed NVA regiment to date in South Vietnam. The parent unit of the 88th Regiment is the 308th Division. If past patterns of infiltration were followed, cadre from this regiment were probably left in the DRV to form and train a new 88th Regiment.

3. Total confirmed NVA strength in South Vietnam now stands at 32,810. Another 4,200 men in various units are carried in the probable or possible categories. In addition, there are a number of units

which are not included in the above-mentioned categories. There is presently insufficient evidence on these reported units to include them in the order of battle but, if the reports are accurate, the total number of North Vietnamese troops now in South Vietnam would be well over 50,000 men.

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
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



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- One such recently reported unit is of particular interest. Two North Vietnamese soldiers captured in late May in western Pleiku Province in the vicinity of Chu Pong Mountain stated that they were members of the 95th Artillery Battalion of the 68th Artillery Regiment. They stated that their regiment was formed in October 1965 in the DRV using cadre from the 304th Division and the 351st Artillery Division. The units making up the regiment were the 95th Battalion (120-mm. mortar) and the 10th and 11th battalions (105-mm. howitzer). The 95th Battalion left North Vietnam in February 1966 and arrived in the Chu Pong area in May. did not bring their weapons with them but had them issued upon arrival. According to their ID cards, their final destination was the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the southern part of South Vietnam (Nambe). According to MACV, this is the first instance since early 1965 indicating that infiltration groups have been destined this far south rather than Military Regions 5 or 6.
- 5. A recently received translation of a note-book captured from a member of Infiltration Group 623 which left the DRV in August 1965 indicates that this unit arrived in War Zone "D" in late 1965. This was one of the first indications that entire North Vietnamese units--probably battalions--were being sent to Nambe.

Operational Status of Major Surface Lines of Communications

There was a limited decline in the operational capability of South Vietnam's major highways during the period 4-11 June. Specifically Route 13 in Binh Duong Province, Interprovincial Route 4 in Vinh Binh Province, and Route 17 "A" in Bac Lieu Province were closed. No change was reported in the operational capability of the nation's coastal railway.

Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

7. The week of 4-11 June compared with the previous week of 28 May - 4 June

I. Viet Cong Incidents

Time Period	At- I	Regimental size	Battalion size	Company size	Terrorism
28 May - 4 June	9	0	2	5	457
4-11 June	9	0	4	0	525
Time Period	Sabota	ge Propa	aganda Ai	Anti- ircraft	Total Incidents
28 May – 4 June	88	:	16	121	691
4-11 June	49		11	139	733

II. Casualties

	110 /D	ATTAT	CITY		
	VC/P		GVN		
	28 May-4 June	4-11 June	28 May-4 June	4-11 June	
Killed	902	1,240	121	151	
Wounded			219	328	
Missing/Captured	120	166	23	30	
missing/captared	120	100			
TOTAL C	1:000	1 400	0.00	E00	
. TOTALS	1,022	1,406	363	509	
		_			
	U			RLD	
	28 May-4 June	S 4-11 June	FREE WOI 28 May-4 June	4-11 June	
Killed					
	28 May-4 June 109	4-11 June 142	28 May-4 June 14	4-11 June 6	
Wounded	28 May-4 June 109 636	4-11 June 142 741	28 May-4 June 14 18	4-11 June 6 14	
	28 May-4 June 109	4-11 June 142	28 May-4 June 14	4-11 June 6	
Wounded Missing/Captured	28 May-4 June 109 636 4	4-11 June 142 741 4	28 May-4 June 14 18 0	6 14 0	
Wounded	28 May-4 June 109 636	4-11 June 142 741	28 May-4 June 14 18	4-11 June 6 14	

III. Weapons Captured

	VC/I	PAVN	GVN	
	28 May-4 June	4-11 June	28 May-4 June	4-11 June
Individual Crew-served	291 22	$\begin{array}{c} 413 \\ 22 \end{array}$	38 _0	91 _0
TOTALS	313	435	38	91

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Government Forces Move in Hue

- The impasse between government forces and dissident elements in Hue was broken today when police field forces from Saigon and a battalion of progovernment airborne troops began clearing away Buddhist altars which have been blocking the streets for some ten days. Buddhists protesting the removal of the altars were dispersed by tear gas, and eligible draftees among them were detained for possible induction into the armed forces. By evening (Vietnam time), government troops were in control of the main roads leading into the city after having cleared them of obstructions. Today's action followed hours of effort last night by government commanders to persuade Buddhists to remove their altars and disperse peacefully.
- Buddhist and "struggle" force elements in the city are apparently maintaining their nonviolent approach to the government's action thus far. a broadcast over the clandestine "Voice of Buddhist Salvation" today, the 1st Division Buddhist chaplain appealed to troops to remain nonviolent in their protests of the government's "repression of Buddhism." During the day one group of some 400 1st Division troops reportedly demonstrated against the government's action but dispersed without violence. Other dissident troops and Buddhists gathered at pagodas and at 1st Division headquarters in the city. Reports of a clash between local troops and the airborne battalion during the early evening hours (Vietnam time) remain unconfirmed as yet. At last report. the city was quiet at midnight (Vietnam time).
- 3. Tri Quang, continuing his hunger strike in a city hospital, reportedly is to be placed under "informal" detention by the government and will be allowed no contact with visitors.

4. Further government action will probably include completing a sweep of the city and a blockade of pagodas in which some "struggle" force leaders have reportedly taken refuge. Government force may also be applied soon in the northernmost provincial capital of Quang Tri, where "struggle" influence has also been strong.

Buddhists in Saigon

- 5. Buddhist monks today continued their efforts to organize demonstrations in the capital area for the fourth consecutive day. Police, meanwhile, continued to make arrests and set a 9 p.m. (Vietnam time) curfew in Saigon this evening. One tactic recently introduced by the Buddhists has been to block major roads leading into the city with burning piles of trash, which, according to the US Embassy, has thus far worked to the disadvantage of the Buddhists by irritating drivers stuck in rush-hour traffic.
- 6. Conversations between US Embassy officers and two Buddhist Institute leaders today tend to confirm that the militants are now determining Buddhist policy in Saigon. Although Tam Chau remains chairman of the Buddhist Institute, he has lost control over policy and has been absent from Institute proceedings for the past several days. More militant monks on an 11-man Institute policy council are determined to maintain a hard line until Ky and Thieu are deposed. In addition, the General Association of Young Monks and Nuns in Saigon has also come under the control of extremist monks, who have declared that if the Buddhist Institute council does not enforce the policy of Tri Quang, they will.
- 7. One of the Buddhist leaders also told a US Embassy officer today that "all top Institute leaders" (excluding Tam Chau) will go to Saigon city hall tomorrow and ask to be put in jail, in accordance with an earlier, militant Institute communique.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

- The Asian Director of the French Foreign Office, Manac'h, has characterized as "much too optimistic" the 13 June report out of Hanoi by the French Press Agency (AFP) to the effect that the idea of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war is making headway among the North Vietnamese leaders. Manac'h stated that the AFP report did, however, tend to confirm French views that a growing sentiment of nationalism among the North Vietnamese leaders, plus the internal crisis in China, might eventually result in a less rigid attitude by Hanoi. The British consul in Hanoi has also stated his belief that the AFP report is overly optimistic. pointed out that the AFP man has only been in Hanoi a few months and is "very ambitious." He said he thought that the AFP representative does not have special access to high Hanoi officials and his reports are probably based on diplomatic corps rumors.
- 2. Manac'h expressed the opinion that the North Vietnamese Government must have been aware of the content of the AFP report because it was filed in the Hanoi post office. Since Hanoi did not refuse to allow the story to be sent, the French official reasoned, the North Vietnamese at least were not opposed to having AFP's interpretation of Hanoi's attitude on peace negotiations spread through the Western press.
- 3. The AFP report had cited certain factors which it alleged had led to the feeling in Hanoi that a "new atmosphere" had developed "within the past few days." The factors cited were: (1) All of Hanoi's allies with the exception of Peking ardently desire an early end to the Vietnam war; (2) "Reliable" sources indicate that Hanoi is now prepared to help the US "lose gracefully"; (3) Hanoi now believes it is in a position of strength and can therefore seek an end to the war without losing face; and (4) The forthcoming visit to Hanoi of former French cabinet minister Jean Sainteny could provide an opening for peace moves.

4. The first two factors cited are, of course, not new. Hanoi has long stated its position that it would help the US withdraw gracefully from South Vietnam. The Eastern European bloc nations have long made it clear that they wish the war would end. As for the third factor, there is nothing to indicate that Hanoi believes its military position is any stronger now than it was in the past. Manac'h downplayed the significance of Jean Sainteny's trip, claiming that the AFP story "exaggerated" its importance. North Vietnamese statements in recent days have indicated no change in Hanoi's insistence on US acceptance of the "four points."

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 May 1966

1. General Statistical Data:

		Viet	Ki.	lled	Wou	nđed						
		Cong		ln	i		Capt		Tot		Wea	pons
Time		Inci-		ion	Act		or Mi			lties	Los	
· Peri	ođ	dents	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	ΛC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	1 16	390	890	1896	_	_
. Jan	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
- 00	1964	1770	343	1223	913	_	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	_	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
	1966	3914	747	2648	1557	-	450	588	2754	3236	935	979
	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	_	_
Feb	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
r en	1964	2078	374	1055	916	_	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	_	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
	1966	3100	1015	4727	2095	-	477	508	3587	5235	1076	1219
	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	_	
Mar	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
rial	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	_	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	_	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
	1966	3670	938	5685	1961	_	466	604	3365	6289	1393	1632
	1900	3070	930	2002	1901	-	400		3303		1373	1.002
	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
Apr	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
•	1964	2284	594	1671	1584		398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	_	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
	1966	3235	573	2818	1522	_	121	483	2216	3301	594	829
	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632		_
May	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987		202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
- •	1966	3566	661	4239	1454	-	196	652	2311	4891	493	1087
	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	_	_
Jun	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510		_
Jul	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812		510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882

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Time Peri		Viet Cong Inci- dents		lled in tion VC	Wou i Act GVN			ured Issing VC	Tot Casua GVN	al lties VC		pons ses VC
Aug	1962 1963 1964 1965	1642 1349 2580 2498	377 411 721 808	2271 1685 1449 3624	626 804 1612 1945	367 237 - -	63 352 478 287	669 482 282 606	1066 1567 2811 3040	3307 2404 1731 4230	637 1106 705	- 428 619 1074
Sep	1962 1963 1964 1965	1375 1763 3091 2473	419 672 819 655	2218 1982 1187 3485	646 1155 1759 1724	365 234 - -	59 566 7 37 2 66	446 347 230 838	1124 2393 3315 2645	3029 2563 1417 4323	878 1465 778	389 525 838
Oct	1962 1963 1964 1965	1357 1422 2827 3330	365 428 739 961	1967 1520 1617 3874	619 989 1583 2416	286 244 - -	64 398 693 225	373 236 576 660	1048 1815 3015 3602	2626 2000 2193 4534	753 1510 762	330 482 1013
Nov	1962 1963 1964 1965	1311 3182 1982 3638	410 664 574 1034	1982 2333 1747 5516	834 1554 1404 2056	368 373 - -	92 665 410 520	561 252 570 592	1336 2883 2388 3610	2911 2958 2317 6108	1595 1104 1126	- 455 515 2164
Dec	1962 1963 1964 1965	1346 1921 2504 4106	294 389 1002 1239	2203 1440 1813 4076	618 961 2053 2262	289 191 - -	78 320 1092 926	463 190 503 516	990 1670 4147 4427	2955 1821 2316 4592	724 2111 1728	546 666 1158

Composite Annual Totals

Time			WI	A	-	ured ssing	Tota Casua		Wear Loss		
Perio	d dents	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
* *											
1962	19076	4417	21158	719 5	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	_	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965	31529	11243	35436	23118		7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	
**1966	17485	3934	20117	8589	_	1710	2835	14233	22952	4491	5746

^{*}Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses. **Through 31 May 1966



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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 May 1966

			ATT	ACKS					
Time	Viet Cong	Small-			_	_		Propa-	Anti-
Period	Incidents	Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	ganda	Aircraft
106	1005	F20	2.7	^	5.40	0.20	100	0.55	
1962 Jan 1963		528	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
Jan 1963		242	8 2 5	2 3	252	447	49	179	-
		218		1	223	1244	129	174	-
1965		57 42		5	63	1489	272	170	212
1966	3914	42	23	5	70	2490	312	299	743
196	2 1460	480	20	0	500	613	137	210	_
Feb 1963	788	181	13	1	195	433	69	91	_
1964		211	3	3	217	1389	210	271	_
1965	1982	73	6	3 3	82	1411	267	91	131
1966	3100	50	10	9	69	1829	201	172	829
				_					
1962		561	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
Mar 1963		333	11	0	344	653	131	154	-
1964		198	4	1	203	1632	158	167	
1965		80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
1966	3670	32	10	10	52	2332	212	154	920
1962	2 1933	470	27	0	497	1024	220	192	-
Apr 1963		371		3	383	688	105	155	-
1964		211	9 6 1 7	3 3 4	220	1738	169	157	_
1965	1860	38	1	4	43	1407	149	96	165
1966	3235	61	7	9	77	2238	252	110	513.
1962	2 1825	490	28	0	528	892	154	251	
May 1963		344	13	ő	357	608	93	150	_
1964		170	3	2	175	418	217	140	193
1965		40	7	11	58	1558	365	115	170
*1966		37	9	7	53	2552	295	106	560
1700	, 3300	3,	,	•		2332	2,,	100	500
1962		339	23	0	362	736	1 5 7	222	-
Jun 1963		398	11	1	410	652	107	142	_
1964	2062	128	10	2	140	1390	176	162	194
1965	2597	62	1	6	69	1784	469	103	172


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
			ATT	ACKS				Γ	
Time	Viet Cong	Small-						Propa-	Anti-
Period	Incidents	Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	ganda	Aircraft
1962	2 1564	437	10	1	448	735	158	223	_
Jul 1963		398	8	i	407	698	80	183	_ _
1964		166	12	7	185	2132	286	224	218
1965		42	0	6	48	1706	400	154	212
1905	2520	42	v	O	40	1706	400	134	212
1962	2 1642	3 68	10	0	378	885	146	233	_
Aug 1963	1349	356	11	1	368	647	113	221	_
1964		107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
1965		38	9	5	52	1597	349	200	300
			_	_					
1962		382	9	0	391	624	178	182	-
Sep 1963		483	17	3	503	889	164	207	-
1964		110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
1965	2473	19	7	5	31	1530	278	185	449
1962	2 1357	406	12	1	419	583	189	166	_
Oct 1963		359	6	ō	365	802	105	150	_
1964		75	2	6	83	1790	480	197	277
1965		24	8	12	44	1969	415	198	704
1,00	3330	~ -1	Ü		••	2505		2,0	, , ,
1962	2 1311	411	7	3	421	614	144	132	-
Nov 1963	3182	631	11	3	645	1990	269	278	-
1964	1982	57	2	1	60	1391	247	109	175
1965	3638	26	16	10	52	2234	486	255	611
1962	2 1346	375	8	1	384	670	107	185	_
Dec 1963		258	3	Ö	261	1298	111	251	_
1964		81	9	6	96	1719	318	128	243
			18	7	57	2572	442	317	718
1965	4106	32	18	,	37	23/2	442	317	/18
			Com	posite Annu	al Total	s			
1962	2 19076	5247	6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963		4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964		1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965		531	73	81	685	20730	4132	1974	4008
			73 59	40			1272	841	
*1966	17485	222	59	40	321	11486	14/4	041	3 565


*Through 31 May 1966

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
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




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Metalogical



GVN statistics do not difficientiate between deserters who eventually return or enlist in other government units remain AWOL, or defect to the Viet Cong. Statistics do show that 53% of the regular force desertions are among draftees who comprise 13% of the regular force strength.

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